Open Access Research Article

Democracy, Freebies, and Development: The Indian Paradox

Authors

  • Janardan Behera * Department of Statistics, Ravenshaw University, Cuttack, India.

https://doi.org/10.22105/masi.v3i2.105

Abstract

India’s democracy, the largest by voter count, lives with a quiet paradox: GDP grows at 6% a year, yet human development barely stirs. This article traces that gap to three interlocking forces: The contested legitimacy of Electronic Voting Machines, the runaway freebie spiral among state governments, and the murky financing of electoral competition. Using RBI State Finances (2022-2025) reports, the ACM CCS security study by Wolchok et al. [1], PRS Legislative Research, examining the 2024 twin rulings of the Supreme Court on VVPAT verification and on the Electoral Bond Scheme, and datasets on the wealth of ADR candidates, the article illustrates how Indian politics (electoral in particular) invariably exchanges long-run public provision for short-run handouts. These figures paint a grim picture. Expenditure on subsidies in 24 states was Rs 3,18,815 crore in FY2023-24, constituting 9% of total revenue receipts, with Punjab hogging out roads, schools, and hospitals at 21%. Rs 1.35 lakh crore was the estimated cost of conducting the 2024 general election, the highest ever in the world on a per-voter basis, while the Electoral Bond Scheme had funneled in Rs 12,979 crore in anonymous corporate monies before the Supreme Court struck it down in February 2024. India consequently ranks 134th on the Human Development Index (HDI) despite being the fifth-largest economy; only 43% of Class 5 rural children can read a Class 2 text; public health spending at 2.1% of GDP is less than one-quarter of the OECD average. The article closes with a five-pillar reform agenda grounded in comparative democratic experience and India’s own constitutional framework.

Keywords

Electronic voting machines Freebie culture Electoral finance Black money Fiscal crowding out Populist redistribution Human development VVPAT Electoral bonds
References (35)
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  2. [2] UNDP. (2023). Human development report 2023-24 Breaking the gridlock: Reimagining cooperation in a polarized world. https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2023-24

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How to Cite

Behera, J. . (2026). Democracy, Freebies, and Development: The Indian Paradox. Management Analytics and Social Insights, 3(2), 110-128. https://doi.org/10.22105/masi.v3i2.105

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